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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in the matter, pursuant to Section
8-2a-3 (2) (f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD)
Defendant was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel, as
required by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of
Utah; in the following ways:
(a) Failure to assure that a record was made of all bench conferences;
(b) failure to assure that a record was made of any juror's questions
during deliberation;
(c) failure to object to, or adequately answer, questions submitted by the
jury;
(d) failure to move for a new trial, based on one juror's comments during
the polling process.
"When, as in this case, the claim of ineffective assistance is raised for the
first time on appeal, we resolve the issue as a matter of law." State v Gallegos,
967 P.2d 973, 975-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted).
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The Trial Court committed clear error by failing to record the bench
conferences, and address the equivocal comment of Juror Hafen, and by failing
preserve any communications from the jury during jury deliberations.
Due process challenges are questions of law that we review applying a
correction of error standard. See Tolman v Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d
23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

ISSUES
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing, to keep
a record, and by failing to move for mistrial on the basis of juror Hafen's
statement. Specifically:
(a) Failing to assure that a record was made of all bench conferences;
(b) failing to assure that a record was made of any juror's questions
during deliberation;
(c) failing to object to, or adequately answer, questions submitted by the
jury;
(d) and by failing to move for a new trial, based on one juror's comments
during the polling process.
See State v Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 246 Utah Adv. Rep. 11(U Ct App
1994)QuotingMzrA: VII Fin. Consultants Corp. v Smedley, 792 P.2d 130,134
(Utah App. 1990) (holding that parties have burden of compiling record '"that
will adequately preserve their arguments for review in the event of an appeal'")
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(quoting Franklin Fin. v New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah
1983)).
The Trial Court committed clear error by failing to record the bench
conferences, and failing to address the equivocal comment of Juror Hafen, and
failing to preserve any communications from the jury during deliberations. See
State v Parker, 2000 UT 51, |6,4 P.3d 778. Plain error requires a showing that
"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (iii) the error is harmful; i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome ... (for Defendant)." Id. at | 7 (quoting
State v Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)). To show obviousness of the
error ... (Defendant) must show that the law was clear at the time of trial. See
State v Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating "error is not plain
where there was no settled appellate law to guide the trial court").

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS
Tarrell McKay Hughes, Defendant / Appellant, was arrested on December
31,1995.
October 23,1997, the Court imposed a prison sentence, and fines, against
Defendant, but suspended the sentence and ordered Defendant to serve a year in
the Washington County Jail. [R. 132-35]
November 24,1997, Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal, pro se. [R.
139]
Brief on Appeal
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January 6,1998, Order of Dismissal of Appeal for failure to file (a timely)
Docketing Statement. [R. 161]
January 21,1998, Reinstatement of Case pursuant to filing of Docketing
Statement. [R. 162]
September 15,1998, Order denying motion for remand and ordering
temporary remand to trial court for determination whether appellant entitled to
new counsel on appeal. [R. 252]
November 24,1998, Order Substitution of Counsel. [R 262-263]
March 24, 1999, Handwritten Letter (from Defendant) requesting New
Public Defender, (Denied 3-30-99). [R 264]
April 1,1999, Handwritten Letter (from defendant) requesting hearing on
denial of counsel, (Denied 4-5-99). [R. 265]
April 28,1999, Request for Transcripts. [R. 266-267]
June 23,1999, Reporters Worksheet. [R. 273-274]
September 13,1999, Reporter's Transcripts, (three). [R. 275-276-277]
The supplemental index, as filed with the Court on September 15,1999,
ends and no other documents are found in the Trial Courts Record. However,
activities that occurred, and are part of the Appellate Court's record, follow:
1.

June 22,1998, a motion to remand, for determination of

ineffective assistance of counsel, was first filed by then Defendant's /
Appellant's original counsel, Douglas D. Terry. Mr. Terry had also been the
trial counsel.
Brief on Appeal
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2.

September, 15,1998, said motion to remand was denied,

without prejudice, by order of the Court; over the signature of James Z. Davis,
Presiding Judge, [R. 252-253], as Terry could not lawfully bring this motion,
against himself, while still representing this client.
3.

By that same order, a limited remand was directed to the

Trial Court to determine if the Defendant / Appellant was entitled to new
counsel for the appeal.
4.

January 15,1998, the Docketing Statement, filed by Trial

Counsel, Douglas D. Terry, had one issue, ineffective assistance of counsel.
5.

May 24,2001, Defendant's/Appellant's Motion to Augment

the designated record, due to an omission, pursuant to rule 22 (b) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
6.

June 8, 2001, that Motion was ruled moot when a court clerk

found the missing transcript.
7.

October, 2001, Defendant / Appellant filed a Motion for

Remand, under rule 23B, for an evidentiary hearing.
8.

November 2, 2001, Plaintiff/Appellee filed a Memorandum

in opposition to the foregoing Motion.
9.

December 4,2001, Defendant's / Appellant's Rule 23B

Motion was denied.
Brief on Appeal
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STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution's Amendments V and XIV and the Utah
Constitution Article I Sections 7,10 and 12.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On December 31,1995, Officer Matt Stoker, of the St. George Police

Department, observed the Defendant driving on St. George Boulevard. [R. 275,
p. 60-61]
Because Officer Stoker had reason to believe Defendant was driving on a
suspended license, he decided to pull Defendant over and investigate. [R. 275,
p. 61-62]
2.

With Officer Doug Sargent assisting, Officer Stoker approached

Defendant's vehicle and asked him if his drivers' license was suspended.
Defendant confirmed that it was. [R. 275, p. 63-64]
3.

Officer Stoker told Defendant, he would check for outstanding warrants

and that, if there were none, he would only issue Defendant a citation.
However, he told Defendant that he would have to lock his vehicle and walk to
his destination. [R. 275, p. 64]
4.

Upon contacting dispatch, Officer Stoker learned that Defendant was

wanted on an outstanding bench warrant issued in a civil case. [R. 275, p. 65]
Accordingly, Officer Stoker returned to the vehicle and informed Defendant that
Brief on Appeal
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he was under arrest on the bench warrant, and for driving on a suspended
license. [R. 275, p. 65-66]
5.

Defendant exited the car as instructed, but balked when Officer Stoker

attempted to handcuff him. [R. 275, p. 66-67] When the officers moved toward
him, Defendant ran around to the other side of the car, swore at the officers, and
began to run. [R. 275, p. 68-69]
6.

Both officers returned to their squad cars and pursued Defendant. [R.

275, p.70] The officers chased Defendant a short distance before Defendant ran
behind a home. The officers exited their vehicles and confronted Defendant in
the backyard. They again informed him that he was under arrest and that he
should stop resisting. Defendant refused to comply and continued swearing at
the officers. [R. 275, p. 71]
6.

At some point, Officer Sargent noticed that Defendant had something in

his hand. The officers asked Defendant what it was, and Defendant answered
that he had his house keys. Upon closer inspection, the officers determined that
Defendant actually held a pair of needle-nose pliers. [R. 275, p. 72]
7.

Realizing that the pliers could be used as a dangerous weapon, the officers

backed up and, once again, informed Defendant that he was under arrest and
ordered him to drop the pliers. Defendant refused. [R. 275, p. 74]
8.

In an effort to bring Defendant under control, and prevent the situation

from escalating further, Officer Stoker sprayed Defendant with pepper spray.
Defendant immediately turned and ran into the home. [R. 275, p. 75]
9.

The officers pursued Defendant into the hone and soon discovered him in

the kitchen with several other people. Defendant turned to face the officers and
Brief on Appeal
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brandished the pliers at them. Officer Sargent drew his gun and instructed
Defendant to drop the pliers. Again, Defendant refused and, instead, taunted the
officers, telling them to go ahead and shoot him. [R. 275, p. 76-78]
10.

When Defendant ran toward Officer Stoker, the officer again sprayed

Defendant with pepper spray. The officers were then able to wrestle Defendant
to the ground and handcuff him. [R. 275, p. 79]
11.

Defendant continued to fight and struggle as the officers removed him

from the home. As the Officers escorted Defendant to the squad car,
Defendant's ex-wife, who had been inside the home during the struggle,
followed them. As the officers were attempting to wash the pepper spray from
Defendant's eyes, Defendant's ex-wife told Defendant that one of the officers
had told her to shut up. Defendant asked the officers, who had told her to shut
up. Officer Sherman Steffens, who had arrived to assist in the arrest, stated that
he had told her to be quiet. In response, Defendant reared back and kicked
Officer Steffens in the knee, causing him to collapse. [R. 275, p. 81]
12.

To restrain Defendant, and to prevent any further injury to anyone else,

the officers placed restraints on Defendant's legs and attached the leg restraints
to the handcuffs. Despite these restraints, Defendant continued to struggle and
succeeded in biting Officer Steffens on the arm. [R. 275, p. 83-84]
13.

Finally, Defendant was placed in the back of a patrol car and transported

to the jail. [R. 275, p. 84]
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The failure of Defendant's trial counsel to "assure that an appealable
record of all bench conferences were preserved is evident from the trial
transcript. [R. 275, pp 85,101, R. 276, p 316]
Defendant's trial counsel failed to request a new trial based on a juror's
equivocal comments, during the polling process. [R 276, p 357]
Thus, the record on appeal is clearly adequate to validate these two
claims.
The Trial Court committed clear error by failing to record the bench
conferences and address the equivocal comment of Juror Hafen.
These errors, and failures, resulted in Defendant / Appellant being denied
a fair and impartial jury, a unanimous verdict, and a complete and appealable
record, denying his right to due process, as guaranteed by United States
Constitution's amendments V and XIV and the Utah Constitution Article I
Sections 7,10 and 12.

ARGUMENT
DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT THE TARRELL McKAY
HUGHES CASE BE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE:
1.

THE TRIAL COURT LOST, OR FAILED TO KEEP, A NOTE, OR
NOTES, WRITTEN TO THE COURT, BY THE JURY, AND

NOTES WRITTEN BY THE COURT, TO THE JURY, DURING
Brief on Appeal
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DELIBERATIONS, AND FAILED TO MAKE, OR KEEP, ANY
RECORD OF SAID NOTES. REFERRED TO IN TERRY
AFFIDAVIT, (see addendum)
2.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECORD ANY OF THE
SIDEBAR CONFERENCES HELD DURING THE TRIAL,
DEPRIVING THE DEFENDANT / APPELLANT OF A
COMPLETE, APPEALABLE RECORD.

3.

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST A
NEW TRIAL BASED ON A JUROR'S EQUIVOCAL COMMENTS,
DURING THE POLLING PROCESS. [R 276, P 357]
Hughes' case merits a remand for a new trial on the basis that the Trial

Court failed to make any record revealing the communication, between the
jury and the judge, during deliberations. The jury notes, referred to in the
Terry Affidavit, are not referenced anywhere in the record on appeal. The
record reflects no curiosity, on the part of the Court, about the statement of
Juror Hafen, when being polled, post verdict; thus, surely, indicating prior
knowledge on the part of the Court. [R 276, p 357) See State v Tumi, 2000
UT 38 J 3, 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (remanding case for new trial, where
record on appeal was incomplete, because half of Defendant's trial was not
recorded, could not be effectively reconstructed, and missing information
was critical to Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on
appeal).
In failing to keep the note, or notes, or make any record of same, or to
record, or in anyway make a record of, the sidebar conferences at which trial
counsel's arguments would be expressed and preserved for appeal, the trial court
Brief on Appeal
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violated Hughes' constitutional right to an appeal, and his due process rights, to
not be deprived of his liberty without due process of law; in that the record is
incomplete, and he cannot adequately brief an issue that he legitimately raised
before the court. Id.: see Utah Cont. Art, I, § 7 ("[n]o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law"); U. S. Const., amend. V
and XIV (same); Utah Const. Art. I § 12 ("(i)n criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have . . . the right to appeal in all cases")
In the present case, Juror Hafen, when polled by the Court, informed the
Court that she had a question that, due to the lack of having been provided an
answer, affected her ability to arrive at an opinion; one that would have changed
the verdict for the Defendant / Appellant. [R 276, p 357] In Juror IleneHafen's
response, she, stated, as to her finding of Defendant's / Appellant's guilt,
"Because there was not clarification of one of my answers, yes, it is —
[inaudible] questions, I mean. "
There is nothing in the record to tell us what the juror's question was;
thus, the question can not be addressed on this appeal. The record does not
reflect any reaction on the part of the Trial Judge to the juror's response.
See State v Russell, 733 P.2d at 164;
The purpose of jury polling is to "determine that
the verdict signed by the foreman is that of the
individual jurors and not one that has been coerced or
caused by mistake." (citing State v Agtuca, 12 Wash.
App. 402, 529 P.2d 1159 (1974));
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Also see: M. J. Greene, Annotation, Juror's
Reluctant, Equivocal, or Conditional Assent to
Verdict, on Polling, as Ground for Mistrial or New
Trial in Criminal Case, 25 A.L.R.3d 1149,1151-52
(1969) (noting that juror's attitude toward verdict
must be determined by the trial judge not only from
the exact words used by the juror, but from all the
circumstances, including the juror's expression and
demeanor" and without extraordinary evidence to the
contrary, "the determination of the trial judge will not
be disturbed on appeal").
The law was clear, in 1997, that inquiry by the Trial Judge was required to
ascertain the reason for the equivocal answer, and conditional assent, to the
verdict. This record does not reflect any inquiry into the conditional assent to
the verdict by Juror Hafen. See US v Hernandez-Garcia, 901 F.2d 875, 878
(10th Cir. 1990)
"In any case upon the appearance of any
uncertainty or contingency in a jury's verdict it is the
duty of the trial iudge to resolve that doubt, for there
is no verdict as long as there is any uncertainty or
contingency to thefinalityof the jury's
determination.'" (emphasis added) (quoting United
States v. Morris, 612 F.2d 483, 489 (10th Cir. 1979);
Cook v United States, 379 F.2d 966, 970 (5th Cir.
1967)). To that end, "where a juror when polled gives
an uncertain or equivocal answer, it would seem that
before discharging the jury or directing it to resume its
deliberations, a district judge should first attempt to
clear up the uncertainty."

The Court committed clear error by failing to assure that an appealable
record was made of all bench conferences. There are a total of three bench
conferences, reflected in the record, and none of the three were recorded. [R
275, pp 85, 101, R. 276, p 316].
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A trial court has a statutory duty to maintain all critical papers, pertinent
to the trial proceedings, in order to "create a record that an appellate court may
use to evaluate" issues properly raised by Defendant on appeal, Studor, Inc. v
Examining Bd. Of Plumbers, 929 P. 2d 46,49 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). and, in
turn, to preserve and protect a Defendant's constitutional right to appeal. See
Utah Const. Art. I § 12 (Defendant's right to appeal)' Ut. R. App. Proc. Rule 11
(2000) establishes the court's duty:
(a) Composition of the Record on Appeal. The
original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the
transcript of proceedings, if any the index prepared by
the clerk of the trial court, and tne docket sheet, shall
constitute the record on appeal.
(b) Pagination and Indexing of Record, (1)
Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the
clerk of the trial court snail securely fasten the record
in a trial court case file, with collation in the following
order: ... (c) all original papers in chronological
order;.
(d) Papers on Appeal. (1) Criminal Cases. All of the
papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk
of the trial court as part of the record on appeal. Id.
(emphasis added)
Hughes' right to appeal, under Article I, Section 12, of the Utah
Constitution, plus his right under Rule 11 (a), - (b), and -(d), Utah R. App. P.,
amount to a due process right to the protections afforded therein. See Utah
Const. Art. I § 7 ("{n}o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law"); U.S. Const. Amend. V & XIV (same).
Accordingly, the Trial Court violated Hughes' due process rights when it
failed to preserve the notes, to andfromthe judge and jury, in the record; thus
compromising his right to appeal. See Tunzi, 2000 UT 3813.
This Court, in West Valley City v Roberts, 384 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Ut.
App. 1999), set forth the analysis to determine the propriety of remand, and a
Brief on Appeal
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new trial, where a trial court omits, or fails to include, critical papers in the
record:
Due process "requires that there be a record
adequate to review specific claims of error already
raised." State v Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996) (Footnote omitted). However, we do not
presume error simply because a record is incomplete,
or unavailable. See id. at 560 (holding Defendant not
"unqualifiedly entitled to a complete record") State v
Morello 927 P. 2d 646, 649 Ut Ct. App. 1996, holding
no presumption of "error simply because record is
unavailable"). Rather, lack of an adequate record
constitutes a basis for remand, and a new {trial}, only
where (1) the absence or incompleteness of the record
prejudices the appellant; (2) the record cannot be
satisfactorily reconstructed (i.e.. by affidavits or other
documentary evidence); and, (3) the appellant timely
requests the relevant portions of the record. See
Russell, 917 P. 2d at 558-559 & n. 1; Morello, 927
P.2d at 649; Littlefield v State, 114 N.M. 390, 839 P.
2d 134,138-139 ) (N.M. Ct. App 1992); see also
Emig v Hayward, 703 P. 2d, 1043,1048^9 (Utah
19851 (requiring timely request for transcript or
appellant assumes risk of loss); Department of
Community affairs V Utah Merit Sys. Council, 614 P.
2d 1259,1261 (Utah 1980) (although record was
deficient due to loss of witness's testimony, resulting
from tape recorder malfunction, affidavits cured
defect); Tolman v Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.
2d 23, 27-28] n. 5 (Utah App. 1991) (stating, while
minor omissions in transcript may be inconsequential,
or may be corrected through affidavits, numerous
omissions from transcript constitute grounds for new
hearing),
Id. at 17. Hughes case merits remand and a new trial under all of the Roberts
factors.
First, the "absence ... of [any notes, or any data, reflecting what was in
the notes, or how they were handled,] prejudices" Hughes because the wording
is critical to the analysis. If they are verdict-urging instructions, they are
appropriate only if carefully phrased, so as not to interfere with a Defendant's
constitutional right to a unanimous jury, and, ultimately, to a trial by a fair, and
Brief on Appeal
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impartial, jury. See Utah Const. Art. I § 10 ([i]n criminal cases the verdict shall
be unanimous"; Utah Const. Art. I. § 12(right to fair and impartial jury); U. S.
Const, amend. V & XIV (same); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 21 (1999) ("[t]he
verdict shall be unanimous"); Allen, 164 U.S. at 501-02 (holding verdict urging
instruction was not erroneous); Lactod, 761 P. 2d at 30 (upholding "noncoercive use of Allen charges because ... such charges [are] a reasonable and
proper exercise of the court's power to guide the jury to a fair and impartial
verdict").
See Colorado v Lewis, 676 P. 2d 682, 686 (Colo. 1984) (citations
omitted).
Unanimity requires a free and untrammeled
deliberative process that expresses the conscientious
conviction of each individual juror. Any judicial effort
to avert a deadlocked jury must be approached with a
sensitive regard for a juror's right to hold to his or her
honestly held beliefs about the particular case. An
instruction that constrains an individual juror to
suspend these beliefs merely for the sake of returning a
verdict is, to that extent, antithetical to the unanimity
requirement.
Under Lactod, a verdict urging instruction may be coercive, per se, or
coercive under the circumstances of the case.
Lactod, 761 P. 2d at 30 (citing Lowenfield v Phelps, 484 U.S. 231,237,
108 S. Ct. 546, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1988) (citing Jenkins v United States, 380 U.S.
445,446, 85 S. Ct. 1059,13 L. Ed. 2d 957 (1965) (per curiam)). Although
"there is no prescribed 'ritual of words', indicating whether an Allen charge is
coercive, "courts routinely examine the choice of words used by the court in its
instruction, whether the instruction is verbal or written, in making this
determination". Lactod, 761 P.2d at 30. For example, in Lactod, this Court
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looked to a lengthy statement from the judge, read to the jury on the record, in
deciding that the instruction was not coercive. Lactod, 761 P. 2d at 28, 30-31
(instruction was neither coercive, per se. or under the totality of the
circumstances).
Again, in State v Brown, 853 P. 2d 851 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme
Court relied on the transcript of the verbal instruction to the jury in holding that
it was not coercive under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 861; see also
Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 235, 241 (holding Allen instruction proper under
circumstances of case).
The importance of the actual choice of words, used in a verdict urging
instruction, is emphasized by the fact that the American Bar Association
("ABA") has set forth recommended standards in order to avoid violating a
Defendant's right to a trial by a fair, and impartial, jury, and due process right to
a unanimous jury verdict. See ABA Standards Relating to Trial by Jury § 5.4
Without the note, or notes, in the Hughes' case, Hughes is missing critical
information that is pertinent to the analysis on appeal and, therefore, is
prejudicial to his appeal, since he cannot effectively brief the argument for this
Court. Indeed, it is impossible for Hughes, or this Court, to analyze whether the
instruction contained "certain inherently coercive ideas", which might render it
coercive, per se. Lactod, 761 P. 2d at 31. Hughes, and this Court, is likewise
prevented from analyzing whether the note is coercive under the circumstances
of his case. Id. at 30. Accordingly, Hughes is prejudicially damaged by "the
absence [of the note]." Roberts, 384 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17; see also State v
Verikokides, 925 P. 2d 1255,1256 (Utah 1996) (an appellate "court cannot
review a record that does not exist").
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The absence of the note merits a new trial for the added reason that the
note "cannot be satisfactorily reconstructed (i.e., by 'affidavits or other
documentary evidence).'" Roberts, 384 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17. In Tunzi, the
Utah Supreme Court held that reconstruction of the missing record, in that case,
was not feasible, given the nature of the issues on appeal, and the nature of the
missing information. Tunzi 2000 UT 38 f 3. One half of the trial transcript was
missing from the record. Id. In holding that a new trial was necessary, the
Court reasoned that "[rjesolution of the [sufficiency of the evidence] issue
[would] necessarily involve reviewing the evidence contained in the record." Id.
Reconstruction of such a major portion of the necessary information would be
"unduly burdensome", and would not "provide the detail necessary to resolve
the issues on appeal." Id. Moreover, the "burdens and futility associated with
reconstruction of a record are increased exponentially when the issue on appeal
concerns the sufficiency of the evidence." Id.
The reasoning, in Tunzi, compels a like conclusion in Hughes' case. As
noted above the exact wording of a verdict urging instruction is particularly
critical to the analysis on appeal. Accordingly, a mere summation of the note,
based on an affidavit of someone's recollection, is not an effective means of
restoring the record where a challenge to an Allen charge is made. Furthermore,
the vagaries of human recollection, the length of time that has passed between
now and Hughes' April 21st, 1997, trial, and the risk that memory may be
altered as each interested party attempts to "fill in memory gaps", to suit their
own interest, compound the difficulties that would exist if the note was
reconstructed from memory. State v Long, 721, P. 2d 483,490 (Utah 1986)
(discussing shortcomings of human recall, noting that people often tend to
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"unconsciously reconstruct more detailed, logical, and coherent recollections of
their actual experiences").
Moreover, the record is lacking any information that adequately indicates
the substance of any instruction wherein the argument may be briefed. The
pleadings do not contain any minute entries concerning the substance of the
notes, or even their occurrence. The note, or notes, is not included with the jury
instructions. [R. 67-96]
In short, the missing note could not be "satisfactorily reconstructed"
through affidavits, or other parts of the record. Roberts, 384 Utah Adv. Rep. at
17. The note, itself, is dispositive of the issue on appeal. See Tunzi, 2000 UT
38 f 3. Moreover, "a reconstructed record would not provide the detail
necessary to resolve the issues on appeal." Id. Finally the "burdens and futility
associated with reconstruction are increased exponentially" because the issue on
appeal requires analysis of its exact wording. Id.
Hughes' timely, and vigilant, pursuit of the record on appeal distinguishes
his casefromthose, where a lost, or incomplete, record was due to a defendant's
undue delay, or inactivity. The Utah Supreme Court determined that a
defendant's constitutional right to appeal was not violated, where the "difficulty
in reconstruction the record was due, in large part, to the nineteen-month delay
between {his} habeas hearing and the record reconstruction hearing." ,Emig,
703 P. 2d at 1048. Similarly, a defendant's right to appeal was not violated
where the defendant absconded and caused a seven-year delay in proceedings;
during which time, the record of the original trial was lost. See Verikokides, 925
P. 2d at 1257; see also Morello, 927 P. 2d at 648 (defendant was not entitled to
withdraw his guilty plea merely because transcript of his colloquy with trial
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court, regarding his decision to plead guilty, was unavailable; rather, defendant
bore risk that record would no longer be available when he waited nearly 12
years to file motion to withdraw plea).
Unlike the defendants in the aforementioned cases, Hughes has not
absconded from the jurisdiction, or behaved in any other fashion, as to cause
delay and increase the risk of the record being lost, or destroyed, over time. He
filed a pro se Notice of Appeal November 20 1997, twenty-three (23) days
after sentencing. [R. 137] He pursued replacement of his court appointed
counsel when he determined that his appeal was not progressing. At all times,
during the trial, and subsequently during his appeal, Hughes has been
represented by court appointed counsel. Any delays, since the filing of his
Notice of Appeal, have been due to their agenda, not Hughes'. See: Harris v
Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 01/26/1994) {Harris II}
... In Harris I, we laid to rest any argument that
delays by the Public Defender in filing briefs could be
attributed to petitioners on the ground that the Public
Defender requested the continuances on petitioners'
behalf. Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1065. The record
indicated that "the delay in preparing petitioner's brief
on appeal [was] caused by the inability of [the Public
Defender] to address petitioner's case in a timely
fashion." Id. Because this delay was "forced upon an
unwilling petitioner by reason of his indigency," we
held it should not be attributed to the petitioner. Id.
State v Visser, 31 P.3d 584, 2001 UT App 215 (Utah App. 07/06/2001)
TJ14 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant must establish (1) that his trial
counsel's performance was "deficient," and (2) that he
was "prejudiced" by the ineffective assistance.
Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052,2064 (1984). A counsel's assistance is deficient
when a defendant "show[s] that. . . [it] fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688, 104
S. Ct. at 2064. "The proper measure of attorney
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performance remains simply reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms." Id. In determining
whether counsel's performance was deficient, we
must 'indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that under the
circumstances, the challenged action "might be
considered sound trial strategy.'"" State v Garrett, 849
P.2d 578, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,104 S. Ct. at 2065
(citation omitted)).
The sole issue, addressed in the Docketing Statement, filed by trial
counsel, was Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The Affidavit of Trial Counsel
[Terry Affidavit] (see addendum) validates the unrecorded activity during trial,
and demonstrates the fact that these were activities he should have objected to,
and taken steps to assure that a record was made, for the benefit of an appellate
court. Had the questions of Juror Hafen been addressed, or answered, a different
outcome could reasonably have been anticipated.

CONCLUSION
Hughes' constitutional rights to appeal, and due process, were violated
when the Trial Court failed to record the sidebar conferences during the trial;
failed to enquire, on the record, of Juror Hafen's equivocal response during the
polling of the jury; and failed to make any record of enquiries by the said juror,
or any other jurors; and failed to keep any written communications from the
jury.
Hughes was denied his right to effective representation during the trial by
failure of his then counsel to:
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(a) assure that a record was made of all bench conferences;
(b) assure that a record was made of any juror's questions during
deliberation;
(c) object to, or adequately answer, questions submitted by the jury;
(d) move for a new trial, based on one juror's comments during the
polling process.
Defendant / Appellant Tarrell McKay Hughes, requests this Court provide
him due process of law by reversing this conviction and remanding to the Trial
Court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 6th, day of February, 2001.

BrendaWhiteley[7016f

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true, and correct copy of the
above and foregoing document was mailed, first class, postage fully prepaid, on
this 6 day of February, 2002, to: Brett J. Delporto, Assistant Attorney
General, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P 0 Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT
84114-0854.
Dated this 6* day of February 2002.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Case No: 971686-CA

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,

ADDENDUM TO

vs.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

TARRELL MCKAY HUGHES,
Defendant / Appellant.

UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
Article I, Section 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital
cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the
jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist
of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In
civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation

a

against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have
been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or
at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

U.S. Constitution: Bill of Rights
Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

b

without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
Amendment XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state,
or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support
the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims
shall be held illegal and void.
c

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
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DOUGLAS D. TERRY (4158)
Attorney for Defendant
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435)628-4411

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

;)

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS D. TERRY

>

CaseNo.970686-CA

vs.
TERRELL HUGHES,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

]

)
ss.
)

I, DOUGLAS D. TERRY, beingfirstduly sworn depose and say as follows:
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and represented the
Defendant as his court appointed trial counsel in this case.
2. I have personal knowledge of the matters contained herein with the exception of
those matters asserted upon information and belief
3. When the jury returned its verdict, the jury was polled. One of the jurors, in
response to the question as to whether or not she agreed with the verdict, made a statement to the
effect that because her question(s) had not been answered that she concurred with the verdict.
4. It is my recollection that a question or questions were sent to the judge by the

0s

jury during deliberation. I do not have an independent recollection of what those question(s) were.
5.1 do not know whether a record of the question(s) propounded by the jury was
ever made by the court
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SATTH NAUGHT.
DATED this / x w o£Sefteraber, 200J

STATE OF UTAH

)
$$

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)

On this v\ day of September, 2001, personally appeared before me Douglas D.
Terry, the signer of the above and foregoing instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same for the purposes therein set forth.
MOTARYPinuC

NOTARY PUBLIC
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